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Chinese Competition and Brazilian Exports of Manufactures 
1.	Introduction
The most significant change in the global economy over the past three decades has been the re-emergence of China as an economic power.  GDP has grown by more than 9% per annum since 1980 and China is now second only to the United States in terms of output.  Over the same period, the opening of China has led to a major restructuring of the world economy.  Its share of world trade increased from around 1% in 1980 to more than 10% in 2010 when it overtook Germany as the world’s leading exporter.  The dynamic expansion of the Chinese manufacturing sector into world markets has been a major challenge to other developing countries, particularly those which had developed significant manufactured exports.  

In Latin America, it has led some commentators to pose the question of whether there is a future for manufacturing industry in the region (Moreira, 2007; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010).  The fear in Latin America is that growing Chinese demand for primary commodities and increased competition from China in manufactured goods in both the domestic and export markets, is leading the region into renewed specialization in commodity production.  This has revived concerns about “deindustrialization” and the loss of the dynamic benefits derived from an expanding manufacturing sector.  This paper focuses on one particular aspect of this picture, namely the impact of Chinese competition on exports of manufactures.

The early academic literature on this tended to downplay the extent of any “threat” to the exports of the Latin American countries, apart from Mexico (Blasquez-Lidoy et. al., 2007; Schott, 2004).  Indeed the South American countries particularly were seen as major beneficiaries of the growing Chinese demand for raw materials and agricultural products.   However manufacturers in the region complained vociferously that they were losing markets to Chinese competitors in a range of products (Murphy et.al., 2007).  More recent academic research has also suggested that Chinese competition has had a more significant impact on Latin American exports of manufactures than was initially anticipated (Freund and Ozden, 2009; Hanson and Robertson, 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Jenkins, 2010).

This article analyses the impact of Chinese competition on Brazilian exports of manufactures to its major foreign markets.  It is a particularly significant case since Brazil has the largest and most integrated industrial sector in Latin America.  Although it is not as export oriented as Mexico’s, it has nevertheless developed a significant level of manufactured exports, particularly to other countries in the region.  The article shows that Brazil’s share of manufactured imports has been declining in recent years, particularly in the United States and its major Latin American markets, while that of China has increased.  Although this does not necessarily imply any causal relationship, more detailed analysis of various indicators shows that Brazilian exports faced increased competition from China at the product level in these markets.  This was initially felt most strongly in the US, but since the middle of the last decade it has been particularly marked in other Latin American countries.

The paper breaks new ground in that it not only documents the extent of competition from Chinese products, but also provides estimates of the impact that this has had on the value of Brazilian exports to all its major markets.  This shows that since 2004, the largest losses to China have occurred in Chile, the USA and Venezuela.  Losses in the Mercosur countries, where Brazil enjoys preferential market access, and the EU have been less severe.

The article also shows that Brazil has been losing market share to China in a wide range of sectors and products.  Although the largest losses have been in low technology products, there have also been significant losses in hi-tech products such as mobile phones, colour television sets and digital processing equipment in the US and several Latin American countries in recent years.  Thus Brazil has not been able to upgrade its exports as a strategy to deal with competition from China.

2.	The Brazilian Debate
The share of manufactured goods in Brazil’s total exports has declined over the past decade (see Figure 1), which has given rise to concern about the so-called “primarization” of the economy.  This is most marked in terms of current prices which partly reflect the increase in primary product prices during this period as a result of the commodity boom.  However, even when measured in constant price terms, the share of manufactures fell by ten percentage points between 2005 and 2010.  Moreover manufactured exports had already stopped growing in volume terms after 2005, even before the global financial crisis hit.
Figure 1: about here

Brazilian producers in industries such as footwear, textiles and clothing, furniture and telecommunications have complained about the loss of export markets to China (Paraguassu, 2007).  A recent survey by the CNI found that over half of Brazilian exporters faced competition from Chinese products in the markets to which they sell, and that two-thirds of these firms reported that they have lost customers abroad as a result (CNI, 2011).    The Industrial Federation of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP), a long term critic of Chinese competition, has estimated that Brazil lost a total of $12.6 billion of exports to China in the USA, the EU and Argentina between 2004-05 and 2008-9 (FIESP, n.d.).

There is some debate in the academic literature over the extent to which Brazil has been affected by competition from China in third markets.  An early study of competition between Brazil and China in the US, EU, Argentina, Japan and South East Asia, for the period 1996/7 to 2001/2, found that Brazil had lost market share to China in all these destinations apart from Argentina (Machado and Ferraz, 2006).  Losses to China were greatest in the US and were relatively limited in Europe.  The products most affected tended to be low technology, most notably footwear.   A study of competition between Brazil and other exporters to the US in the period up to 2004 found that the largest proportion of losses suffered by Brazil in the US could be attributed to Chinese competition (Batista, 2008).  Again these tended to be mainly low technology products.

Some more recent studies have qualified this negative picture in several respects.  First there is evidence that the product composition of exports from Brazil and China have tended to diverge in recent years.  In the US, for example, the Export Similarity Index between Brazil and China peaked in 2005 (Filgueiras and Kume, 2010, Graph 2).  This is taken as an indication that the degree of competition Brazilian exporters face from China is declining.  Second it has been argued that the products exported by Brazil tend to be of higher quality than Chinese exports implying that they do not compete directly (Filgueiras and Kume, 2010; dos Santos and Zignago, 2010).  Finally, it has also been suggested that competition from China in low technology and low quality products has led to an upgrading of Brazilian exports in terms of both technology and quality levels (dos Santos and Zignago, 2010).

Another development in the recent literature has been to extend the analysis of competition with China from developed country markets to the regional market (Hiratuka and Sarti; Hiratuka and Cunha, 2010, Lelis et. al., 2012; Jenkins and Barbosa, 2012).  Here the evidence points to increased competition between China and Brazil, particularly since China joined the WTO.  Since other Latin American countries are a major export market for Brazilian manufacturers, particularly of more sophisticated products, growing Chinese competition here is seen as a serious concern.  
This paper adds to the existing literature on the impact of Chinese competition on Brazilian exports in several ways.  Most previous studies look at the overlap between Brazilian and Chinese exports in various markets, using the Export Similarity Index or similar measures.  These are used either to analyse the degree of competition from China faced by Brazil compared to other countries, or to look at whether competition between Brazil and China is increasing or falling over time.  What these studies do not do is to provide any quantitative estimate of the effect of Chinese competition on the value of Brazilian exports.  Section 7 of the paper provides such estimates using the methodology developed by Batista (2008).  In addition, the disaggregated approach used here means that it is possible to identify those sectors and products which are most affected by Chinese competition (see Section 8).  

Second, this article is more comprehensive in terms of markets covered than other analyse of competition between China and Brazil.  Previous studies have either focussed on the US market (Batista, 2008; Filgueiras and Kume, 2010), global exports by the two countries (dos Santos and Zignago, 2010) or exports to the Latin American region (Lelís et. al., 2012; Hiratuka and Cunha, 2011).  The US accounts for a declining share of Brazilian exports of manufactures, down to only 10% in 2010 (see Table 1 below).  Comparisons of exports to the world or to an entire region such as Latin America do not provide a meaningful indicator of the impact of competition between Brazil and China since they may export to different markets, either globally or within Latin America.  The only previous study to have attempted a comprehensive analysis of competition between Brazil and China, by market, is that of Machado and Ferraz (2006).  It is also the only study to have analysed competition between Brazil and China in the EU market.  However it only covers the period up to China’s accession to the WTO, whereas competition has intensified considerably since then.

The other studies, apart from Lélis et. al. (2012), have been based on data from the period before the global financial crisis of 2008.  It has been suggested that the slowdown in developed country markets as a result of the crisis has led to a redirection of Chinese exports to emerging markets so that competition for Brazilian exports in Latin America is intensifying (IBRE Letter, 2010).  By analysing data up to 2010 and explicitly sub-dividing the data to compare the year prior to the crisis and 2010, the paper also provides insights into the effect of the crisis on competition between China and Brazil in the region.





Many of the studies of Chinese competition in third markets use the Finger and Kreinin Export Similarity Index (ESI) or analogous measures, which compare the export structures of China and other countries, to evaluate the potential impact of China on a country’s exports (Blasquez-Lidoy et. al., 2007, Schott, 2004).  The index is calculated as:

ESI = ΣMIN(mABi, mACi)              (1)

Where mABi, mACi are the shares of product i, in Country A’s imports from Country B and Country C respectively.  The ESI takes a value of zero when the two countries have no products exported in common and a value of 1 when they have identical export structures.  The more disaggregated the data used, the lower the absolute value of the ESI.

Although the ESI has been widely used in the literature on Chinese competition in third markets, it has been shown to be a misleading indicator of the extent to which a country faces competition from China (Jenkins, 2008).  Because it is based solely on the composition of the two countries’ exports it is not a good measure of the relative threat that China poses to different countries, nor of the changes over time in the degree of competition which a country faces from China.  

It is the latter that is relevant in terms of competition between Brazilian and Chinese exports and a few examples can illustrate the problem.  If the range of products exported by China expands over time into products that are not exported by Brazil, then the ESI is likely to decline although the level of competition experienced by Brazilian exporters has not changed.   If China expands the share of its exports made up of products which are significant for Brazil’s exports, then the ESI tends to rise, but if China displaces Brazilian exporters and the share of these products in Brazilian exports falls below their share in China’s exports, further displacement will lead to a fall in the ESI.   Moreover if China increases its share of US imports of all products, but the structure of Chinese exports remains unchanged, then the ESI does not increase, although the increased market share would suggest greater competitive pressure for other exporters.

An alternative measure which avoids some of these problems is the Index of Competitive Threat (ICT) (Jenkins, 2010).  One possible measure of the threat faced by an exporter is the share of a country’s total exports made up of products in which the competitor has a comparative advantage.  In other words it is the proportion of Brazil’s exports to say the US which are products in which China has a revealed comparative advantage.  While this can provide an indicator of the extent of the competitive threat posed by China, it does not measure the intensity of the threat and, as with the ESI, an increase in China’s share of the market would not necessarily show up as an increased competitive threat.

The ICT attempts to capture both the extent and intensity of the competitive threat posed by China for Brazilian exports by weighting the share of each product in Brazil’s total exports to the US by the share of China in total US imports of each product.  Thus

ICT = ΣkACi*mABi  			(2)

Where kACi –  is the share of China in US imports of product i
and mABi  is the share of product i in total US imports from Brazil.

Like the ESI, the value of the ICT could range from zero, when Brazil and China have no exports in common, to 1 when Brazil’s exports are entirely made up of products in which China’s exports account for the entire market.​[2]​  In practice the value of the index is unlikely to be anywhere approaching unity.  It has an advantage over the ESI in that an increase in China’s share of a particular market, other things remaining equal, leads to an increase in the index.
 
Although the ICT can be used both to analyse whether the competitive threat posed by China has increased or decreased over time and whether Brazil is more or less likely to be affected by Chinese competition than other countries, it shares two limitations with the ESI.    The ESI was initially used, as pointed out above, to identify countries which were most likely to be affected as a result of China’s accession to the WTO, and so was concerned with the future impact of Chinese competition.  Twelve years on from Chinese accession, it is of interest to consider the extent to which Brazilian exports have lost market share to China over the intervening period.  However neither the ESI nor the ICT provide a means of estimating this.  Secondly, although it is possible to disaggregate the contribution made by different groups of products to the overall value of the ESI/ICT, they do not provide a meaningful way of identifying the products which face most competition from China.

Thus in addition to estimating these conventional indices, the paper also uses an extension of Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis to provide further insights into the relationship between Brazilian and Chinese exports to third markets.  This involves decomposing changes in Brazil’s share of the imports of these countries into that part which is attributable to the type of products that Brazil exports and that which reflects the decline in the share of Brazil in imports of each product.​[3]​  To do this, the Constant Market Share method developed by Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) is used.  This decomposes the change in Country B’s share of Country A’s total imports of manufactures into a competitiveness effect, a product composition effect and a relative adaptation effect. Thus the change in the market share can be expressed as:

∆kB = Σ∆kBi*mAi  + Σ kBi*∆mAi + Σ∆kBi*∆mAi  	(1)

where kBi is the share of country B in country A’s imports of product i
and mAi is the share of product i in country A’s total imports of all manufactured goods.

The first term on the right hand side of Equation (1) measures the competitiveness effect, the second term the product composition effect and the third, the relative adaptation effect.  A positive value for the first term indicates that Country B is gaining competitiveness in those products which it exports to Country A.  A positive value for the second term shows that Country B is specialized in products which are increasing their share in the total imports of Country A.  Finally, the sign of the third terms is positive if Country B is gaining market share in those products which are increasing their share in the total imports of Country A.  This is referred to as the relative adaptation effect since it shows the extent to which a country’s exports are responding to changing import demand patterns in their markets.  By using base year (Laspeyre) weights throughout and providing a meaningful interpretation of the interaction (third) term, this method resolves the inconsistencies and arbitrariness of earlier applications of CMS which were pointed out by Richardson (1971).

As with other decompositions, CMS analysis is based on an identity rather than an explicit theoretical model.  It also assumes that the various components are independent of each other.  As a descriptive tool, it indicates what part of the total change in Brazil’s market share can be attributed to changes in its share in each product market.  Over time product market shares change as a result of changing supply conditions in Brazil and other countries.  The net effect of these product level changes in market share is interpreted as reflecting an overall change in competitiveness.  CMS analysis does not provide any explanation of the causes of these changes.

A further criticism made by Richardson (1971) is that if competitiveness is determined by relative prices then the market shares in CMS analysis should be defined in quantity rather than value terms.  If a country’s competitiveness increases and relative prices for its exports fall, this may lead to a reduction in the country’s market share in value terms if the elasticity of substitution is less than one.  Even if this is not the case, the change in market share measured in value terms will be less than the change in volume terms.  In practice CMS studies use values because of the difficulty of obtaining disaggregated product/country price indices that would be required to estimate volume shares which tends to bias the results.

Price is not however the only factor which influences competitiveness, so it is possible for market share to increase without any reduction in price.  Indeed if upgrading occurs in an industry, leading to higher prices for its output and a higher market share in value terms, a measure based on volumes might not show any increase in share.  In this case it would be the volume measure that underestimated the increase in competitiveness.

Richardson’s problem derives from identifying competitiveness with relative prices.  An alternative approach to competitiveness is proposed by Lall and Albaladejo (2004).  They argue that in business, competitiveness is measured in terms of relative market shares or profitability and defend the use of market share as an indicator of “competitive threat” in analysing competition between China and other developing countries.  The concept of market share that is relevant here is defined in value terms rather than physical quantities.

While conventional CMS analysis provides an indication of how far changes in aggregate market share are a result of changes in market shares at the product level for an individual country, it does not indicate to whom market shares have been lost.  The analysis has been extended by Batista (2008) to further sub-divide the changes in a country’s market share as a result of the competitiveness effect between the different countries with which it competes in a given market.

The loss of market share by Brazil (B) to China (C), in a particular product i is defined as:
∆kBCi = ∆kBi* ktCi  - ∆ kCi* ktBi		(3)
where  ktBi and ktCi are the shares of Brazil and China in Country A’s imports of product i, in the base year t.

Summing over all products gives the aggregate loss of market share to China:
∆kBC  = Σ mtAi*∆kBCi		(4)
where mtAi is the share of product i in country A’s total imports of all manufactured goods in base year t.

Summing over all exporters to the destination market gives the total competitiveness effect in a conventional Constant Market Share analysis.  It can be shown that this formula satisfies four desirable properties.​[4]​  Country B cannot lose or gain from itself.  A gain for exporter B from exporter C is equal to the loss of exporter C to exporter B.  The sum of the gains and losses of any country to all its competitors is equal to the total gain or loss of market share by that country.  Finally the gain (loss) of a country to another country is a function of, and has the same sign as, the difference between the growth rates of their exports. 

This method for attributing losses of market share between competing countries is relatively parsimonious in terms of data requirements.  In order to calculate the loss experienced by Brazil to China in the US market, we only need to know the shares of Brazil and China in total US imports of each product at the beginning and end of the period under consideration.  To calculate the loss in $ terms we need the total value of US imports of each product.

As in the case of the general CMS analysis, this extension is primarily descriptive rather than diagnostic.  The decomposition is based on accounting identities and  one should therefore be careful in making any causal inferences from it.  As Batista (2010) has shown, it is consistent with several different models of international trade.  There are however several limitations which could bias the results obtained.

First, as Batista (2010) has pointed out, the model should include domestic production as well as other importers in the analysis of market shares.  If the share of domestic production in total demand remains constant over the period, then the results derived still hold, however if the share of imports changes over time this introduces a bias.  Intuitively one can see that if Chinese imports displace domestic production so that both the share of imports in total demand and the share of China in total imports increase, Brazil might appear to lose market share to China (because its share of imports has fallen) although its share of the total market (including that part supplied locally) remained stable or even increased.  Since industrial production data is so much more aggregated than trade data, including domestic production would involve a considerable loss of detail.  It is essential for the analysis to be meaningful for the products for which market shares are calculated to be close substitutes which is not the case for the data available on domestic production.  However one needs to bear in mind that where the share of imports in total demand is increasing, the extent to which Brazil loses market share to China may be exaggerated.

Second, the fact that the decomposition is consistent with a number of different trade models means that the results are not open to a single interpretation.  A loss of market share to China may be the result of the increased price competitiveness of Chinese products or to the strategic decisions of transnational corporations over where to source their products for different markets.  It might even be the case that supply constraints in Brazil are leading to a fall or stagnation of Brazilian exports to a growing market whereas China is able to expand its production.  It could even be that a third country experiences supply problems which China takes advantage of, but Brazil fails to do so creating the impression that Brazil is losing market share to China.

Third, at the level of particular products, since the calculated loss of market share by Brazil to China depends partly on relative growth rates of exports, the products where Brazil is seen as being most affected by Chinese competition may simply be those where Chinese exports are growing particularly fast, rather than those in which Brazil is uncompetitive.

Despite these limitations, the Batista extension of CMS analysis provides useful additional insights into the competition that Brazil faces from China in its major export markets.

b) Periodization
In order to analyse the way in which these different factors have contributed to changes in Brazil’s market share in its major export destinations, the period since 1996 has been divided into four sub-periods.​[5]​  This periodization reflects the focus of the paper on the impacts of competition from China on Brazilian exports.  The first period was from 1996-2001, prior to China’s accession to the WTO, when it was anticipated that competition from China would be relatively limited.  The period from 2001-2004 can be seen as a transition period following China’s WTO accession when countries continued to impose restrictions on Chinese exports.  Moreover, in Brazil, the period up to 2004 is regarded as a time when the currency was at a competitive level (Soares et. al., 2011). From 2004 Chinese exports to Latin America grew rapidly with several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, granted China “market economy status”.​[6]​   This is likely therefore to have been a period when Brazilian exporters faced increased competition from China in regional markets.  Finally the period from 2007-2010 covers the years when world trade contracted as a result of the global financial crisis and then recovers to pre-crisis levels in 2010 and when as noted above it has been suggested that Chinese competition in peripheral markets is likely to have intensified.  In both these later periods, the Brazilian Real was significantly overvalued.

c) Data
In order to carry out the most disaggregated analysis possible, import data from the relevant markets was obtained at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System.  The data comes from UN COMTRADE and was accessed using the World Bank’s WITS software.   The 1996 version of the Harmonized System was used to ensure a consistent classification of products over the entire period.  Import data reported by each destination was used, rather than exports as reported by Brazil and China since we are interested in competition in each market and the share of each country in the total imports of each destination.   In the case of the EU the data used covers the extra-EU trade of the 25 countries that were members of the EU prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.  Unfortunately UN COMTRADE only has data on EU imports on this basis from 2000 onwards.  It was also impossible to obtain data on Paraguayan imports from China according to the 6-digit 1996 HS for years before 2000.​[7]​

Since the main focus of the paper is on the impact of Chinese competition on Brazilian manufacturing, only imports of manufactured goods were analysed.  A broad definition of manufactures was adopted to include resource-based manufactures which account for a significant share of Brazil’s manufactured exports.  In the later analysis imports are broken down into resource based, low technology, medium technology and high technology products using Lall’s classification (Lall, 2000).

4.	Changing Market Shares in Brazil’s Major Export Markets
Brazil’s most important markets in terms of manufactured exports are Latin America, the European Union and the United States.  For the purpose of this study, attention will be focussed on exports to the EU, the USA, the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), and Brazil’s most significant Latin American markets outside Mercosur, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela​[8]​.  Between them, they accounted for around two-thirds of Brazil’s worldwide exports of manufactures in 2004 and more than a half in 2010 (see Table 1).
Table 1 about here

As Figures 2-4 show, Brazil’s share of manufactured imports in these markets has declined in recent years.​[9]​  In fact over time, there is a clear inverted-U pattern with Brazil’s market share rising from 1999 to a peak around 2005 and then declining in the second half of the decade.  The share of EU imports began to decline somewhat later than elsewhere but there too it has fallen since 2008.  In contrast China has consistently increased its share of imports in all these countries, particularly since it joined the WTO in 2001 (Figure 5).
Figures 2-5: about here
Although the decline in Brazil’s share of manufactured imports by its major markets has coincided with an increase in the share of China in those markets in recent years, this does not necessarily mean that there is a link between the decline in Brazilian participation and increased Chinese competition. Indeed, during the period 1999-2005 both Brazil and China increased their shares of imports in these markets.  In order to explore the extent of competition between the two countries, much more disaggregated data is required in order to establish whether or not they sell the same products in each destination market.

5.	The Extent of Competition between Brazil and China
An initial indication of the degree to which Brazilian and Chinese products compete with each other in third markets is provided by examining the extent to which the products which they export overlap.  Table 2 provides data on how many different HS 6 digit level manufactured products Brazil and China each exported at the beginning and end of the period and the number of products which they exported in common.

Table 2: about here
The first thing to note in Table 2 is that in 2010 China exported a greater range of manufactured goods than Brazil.  Moreover the number of products exported from China to the US and to Latin America has increased significantly since the mid-1990s.​[10]​  The two countries compete in a wide range of products.  Indeed in the case of Brazil, the proportion of all products which it exports that are also exported by China has increased over time, so that by 2010 there were relatively few products which it exported that did not face Chinese competition, particularly in developed country markets and to a lesser extent in Latin America apart from its Mercosur partners..

Table 3: about here
Another way of looking at this data is in terms of the proportion of the value of Brazil’s exports to each country which is accounted for by products which China also exports.  Table 3 shows that the extent to which Brazilian products competed with Chinese goods increased significantly between 1996 and 2010.  By the end of the period more than 70% of Brazilian exports by value faced Chinese competition and in some Latin American countries and the EU, this figure was over 90%.

Figure 6: about here
Despite the limitations of the ESI as an indicator of competition between Brazil and China, its widespread use justifies reporting the results here to provide a point of comparison with other studies.  Although the similarity between Brazilian and Chinese exports may appear to be relatively low, this is partly a reflection of the high level of disaggregation (6-digit HS level) of the underlying data.  The Figure shows that in 2010 there is greater similarity between Brazilian and Chinese exports to Latin American countries than in their exports to the main developed country markets.​[11]​    This partly reflects the fact that a significant share of Brazil’s exports of manufactures to the US and the EU are resource-based, while these make up a much lower proportion of Chinese exports.​[12]​  What is more, the share of RBMs in Brazilian exports to developed country markets have increased since the mid-2000s.  Exports from Brazil to other Latin American countries tend to be concentrated more on non-resource based manufactures and hence are more likely to overlap with Chinese exports.

There is also a different pattern over time.  Whereas Brazilian and Chinese exports to the US and the EU have become less similar since the mid-2000s​[13]​, those to several Latin American countries have continued to increase in similarity, at least up to the global financial crisis at the end of the decade.  In so far as this implies greater competition then it seems that Brazilian exports to the region are likely to be more affected by the China factor than those to developed country markets.


In view of the weaknesses of the ESI as a measure of competition from China discussed earlier, Figure 7 presents the results for the ICT of China for Brazil’s exports to its markets.  This shows even more clearly than Figure 6, the increased competition from China which Brazil has faced over the past decade.  Since the middle of the decade this has tended to accelerate in Latin America as China’s presence in the region grew.  In the US and the EU, the index shows increased competition in the first half of the decade, tending to stabilize or even decline towards the end of the decade.​[14]​ Although the overall market penetration of Chinese manufactures is still not as high in Latin America as in the US, the extent of Chinese competition in the region is rapidly catching up with the level in the US.
Figure 7: about here

The various measures presented in this section indicate that there is competition between Brazilian and Chinese exports in Brazil’s major market.  The data is also consistent with the view that competition with China increased over time.  While this was initially felt most strongly in the US market, since the middle of the last decade increased Chinese competition has been most marked in other Latin American countries.   Since these are major markets for Brazilian exports of manufactured goods, particularly more sophisticated manufactures, this is likely to be a major area of concern in the immediate future.


6.	A Constant Market Share Analysis of Brazilian Manufactured Exports
As was pointed out earlier, one limitation of the type of analysis presented in the last section is that while it can provide useful insights into changes in the extent of Chinese competition faced by Brazil over time and in different markets, it gives no indication of the likely magnitude of the impact on Brazilian exports.  In order to provide such an estimate, we carry out a CMS-analysis of Brazilian exports along the lines described in Section 3 above.

Table 4 shows the contribution of each element to changes in the share of Brazil in imports to the major markets in each of the periods identified above.  In the two periods before 2004, Brazil was able to increase its share of manufactured imports to all its major markets.  However between 2004 and 2007 Brazil’s share declined in all markets apart from the EU and Venezuela, where as was seen earlier, Brazil’s market share peaked later than elsewhere, and Uruguay where it was virtually unchanged.  Between 2007 and 2010, its share of the market fell in all areas.

The data shows that the dominant element accounting for the changes in Brazil’s market share in the different countries was changes in competitiveness at the product level.  When competitiveness increased, Brazil’s market share rose but when competitiveness declined then so too did Brazil’s share of the market.  In some periods and countries the product composition and the relative adaptation effect partly offset the changes in competitiveness, while in others it reinforced them, but these effects were not generally sufficient to reverse the impact of the competitiveness effects.​[15]​

Table 4: about here

It is therefore clear that Brazil’s aggregate loss of market share is not attributable either to an undue concentration of its exports in products for which demand is growing slowly, or to a failure to adapt to changes in the pattern of import demands in its main markets.  What the data shows is that the most significant factor accounting for changes in Brazil’s overall position in manufactured exports is whether it is gaining or losing market shares in those products which it exports.

7.	The Displacement of Brazilian Exports by Chinese Exports
Although the analysis of the previous two sections shows that there is likely to have been some effect of Chinese competition on Brazilian exports, it does not provide any estimate of the extent of such an impact or the contribution that the loss of market to China may have made to the overall decline in Brazil’s market share.  In order to measure this we apply an extension of Constant Market Share Analysis developed by Chami Batista (2008) to divide the loss of market share by a country as a result of the competitiveness effect to the different countries with which it competes in a given market.

Table 5: about here

Table 5 uses this method to calculate Brazil’s loss of market share to China in each of its major export markets using the same HS 6-digit data as before.  The period between 1996 and 2010 was again broken down into the four sub-periods identified previously.    

Throughout the period, the data shows that Brazil has been losing market share to China.  In the period up to 2004, these losses to China were being offset by a gain in competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries, so that Brazil’s overall share of imports to these markets increased.  In more recent years however losses to China have increased and this has contributed to an overall decline in market share.  Because of the very different shares of Brazilian imports in different countries, the Table does not indicate the significance to Brazil of losses in different markets.

Another way to look at the impact of China on Brazilian exports is to consider how much lower Brazil’s exports are to each country at the end of the period than they would have been if there had not been a loss of competitiveness to China.  Table 6 shows this.
Table 6: about here

The general picture that emerges from the Table is that loss of market share to China has become more severe over time, particularly when it is recognised that the first period is longer than the subsequent ones.  The largest losses have occurred since 2004 and these have been most severe in Chile, the US and Venezuela. 

The impact of China on Brazilian exports to the EU has been less pronounced than in other markets.  This is consistent with Figures 6 and 7 which show that there is less similarity between Brazilian and Chinese exports to the EU than to other countries and that the competitive threat from China was consistently lower in the EU than elsewhere.  The contrast with the situation in the US market is particularly interesting with Brazil continuing to increase its share of the market after 2005 in the EU, whereas it fell iin the US (see Figure 2).  This has occurred despite the fact that Chinese import penetration increased at virtually the same rate in the US and the EU after 2000 and was even slightly higher in Europe at the end of the decade (Figure 5).  The main reason for this, and for the lower ESI and ICT between Brazilian and Chinese exports to the two markets, is the difference in the composition of Brazilian exports.  In 2004, over half of Brazilian manufactured exports to the EU were of Resource Based Manufactures (RBM) compared to less than a third of its exports to the US.  By 2010 the share of RBMs had increased to almost two-thirds in the EU, but were still under half of Brazilian exports to the US.  Since RBMs account for only about 5% of Chinese exports to each market, a much higher proportion of Brazilian exports to the EU avoided direct competition from Chinese goods.

Losses to China in the Mercosur countries, where Brazil enjoys preferential market access, have also been less severe than elsewhere up to now.  On the other hand the countries experiencing the largest losses between 2007 and 2010 (Chile, Venezuela, the US and Colombia) had the highest ICTs in the late 2000s. 

The fact that in Latin America (apart from Argentina​[16]​) Brazil’s losses to China increased between 2004-7 and 2007-10 lends some support to the view of those who argue that the slowdown of growth in developed country markets may lead to intensified competition for Brazil in regional markets as China takes advantage of buoyant demand in Latin America. However Brazil has also seen its losses to China rise in the US market in 2007-2010.
Table 7: about here

Another aspect of interest is the extent to which the decline in Brazil’s market share in various countries can be attributed to losses to China.  Table 7 focuses on the periods since 2004 when Brazil was losing market share overall in most of its export markets.
The table shows that losses to China accounted for significant shares of the total decline in Brazil’s share of manufactured imports in most of the country’s major export markets.  The value is negative for the EU, Venezuela and Uruguay between 2004-2007 reflecting the fact that Brazil increased its share of these countries’ imports in this period.  The very high share for Argentina in 2004-2007 is because in that country Brazil was still gaining market share from other exporters.  The other outliers are Mexico between 2007-2010 when the product composition effect and losses to other exporters were more significant than those to China and Paraguay between 2004-2007 when the product composition effect had a major impact.

8.	Loss of Market Share by Sector and Product
So far the analysis has focussed on the loss of market share to China at the aggregate level. One of the advantages of the CMS analysis used in the previous section, compared to other approaches such as the ESI or ICT, is that it is possible to provide a much more disaggregated picture of the relation between Brazilian and Chinese exports at the sectoral and product levels. Given the dynamism of the Chinese economy, it is not that surprising that Brazil has lost market share to China, as have many other countries.  The question then is what sectors and what types of products have been most affected and what has been the impact on the overall pattern of exports.  

The optimistic view is that Chinese competition has mainly affected Brazilian exports of low technology products and that Brazil has been able to respond to this by moving in to products which embody a higher level of technology and better quality than those exported by China (dos Santos and Zignago, 2010).  A more pessimistic view suggests that Chinese competition is not solely confined to low technology products but has increasingly moved in to more sophisticated sectors and that this is “kicking away the ladder” of technological upgrading for Brazil and other Latin American countries (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010, Ch.4).  In this scenario Brazil will concentrate increasingly on exports of primary products and resource-based manufactures, with less potential for generating spillovers and incorporating technological progress.

In order to address this question, the data on loss of market share to China was disaggregated to the 2-digit level of the HS Classification which consists of 97 Chapters.  For ease of presentation, the seven Latin American countries were treated as a group​[17]​ and the results compared with those for the US and the EU markets.  Table 8 presents the top 6 sectors which made up the bulk of the total loss of market share to China in each market between 2004 and 2010.​[18]​
Table 8 about here

The six top ranked sectors in terms of losses to China are the same in the US and EU.  There is one notable difference however in that the sector which accounts for the largest losses in the US is footwear, whereas in the EU footwear only comes sixth.​[19]​  Otherwise the rankings are identical with electrical and non-electrical machinery accounting for the largest losses.  These were followed by wood and wood products, with plywood significant in both markets, and furniture, particularly wooden furniture.  The other sector which was prominent was vehicles and parts, where brakes, wheels and small motorcycles were significant.

In Latin America, the main losses were again in electrical and non-electrical machinery with vehicles and parts also among the top six sectors.  However traditional industries such as footwear and furniture were lower down the rankings in the region.  The other three sectors making the top six were intermediate goods industries: iron and steel, rubber and organic chemicals.  Products from the top six sectors that were particularly affected included mobile phones and colour TVs, digital processing equipment, flat rolled and coil steel, transmission and conveyor belts, motorcycles of between 50 and 250cc, clutches and parts and other organic compounds.​[20]​

This brief analysis of the main sectors in which Brazil has lost market share to China shows that they are by no means confined to labour-intensive, low technology consumer goods, particularly in the case of exports to other Latin American countries.  In order to obtain a more systematic picture of the types of products which have been most affected, Lall’s classification of manufactured exports was applied to the product level data (Lall, 2000).  Lall distinguishes between Resource Based Manufactures and Low, Medium and High Technology Manufactures.​[21]​  

When the data on losses to China are disaggregated in this way, they show that Brazil has been losing market share to China in all types of manufactures since 2004 (see Table 9).   It is true that the largest losses have tended to be in Low Technology products but in a number of markets, particularly Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and the US in the period 2007-2010, there have been significant losses in High Tech products too.  Indeed, in the Latin American countries, the decline in exports as a result of a loss of market share to China has been proportionately greater in high technology products than in low technology products since 2007.
Table 9: about here
This confirms that Chinese competition has not simply displaced Brazilian exports of low technology products.  Nor does it appear that Brazil has been able to compensate for its losses to China by exporting more High Tech products.  In recent years, the share of high tech products in total Brazilian exports of manufactures to these markets has either fallen or fluctuated without any clear tendency to increase (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: about here

9.	Conclusion
This paper presents the most comprehensive analysis that has been carried out so far of the impact of Chinese competition on Brazilian exports of manufactures.  The number of markets analysed, which account for between a half and two-thirds of Brazilian exports during the period, and the consistent results obtained using a variety of different indicators, establish clearly that Brazilian exporters of manufactures have faced significant competition from China over the past decade.  Indeed over time the extent and intensity of Chinese competition has tended to increase and more Brazilian exporters are reporting that they are losing customers abroad to Chinese competitors.​[22]​.  

The use of the Batista extension of CMS analysis to calculate the loss of market share to China made it possible to show the extent to which Chinese competition contributed to the declining share of Brazilian imports in these markets.  This was particularly significant in the period since 2004.  In addition, the fact that the period covered went up to 2010 meant that it was possible to confirm the view that Chinese competition in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as some commentators predicted it would.

Chinese competition is not the only factor that has affected Brazilian exports.  Since 2004, unlike in earlier periods, Brazil has also lost market share to other exporters.  The overvaluation of the Real has undoubtedly played an important part in this general loss of competitiveness (Soares et. al., 2011).  However in terms of the overall losses, China has been a major gainer from Brazil.
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Figure 6: Export Similarity Index between Brazil and China, 1996-2010






Figure 7: Index of Competitive Threat of China to Brazilian Exports, 1996-2010


Source: Own elaboration from UNCOMTRADE


Figure 8: Share of High Technology Products in Brazilian Exports of Manufactures by Major Markets, 2004-2010





















Source:ECLAC, Banco de Datos del Comercio Exterior de América Latina y El Caribe
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^1	   The paper is based on a research project carried out with Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa of the University of Sao Paulo on Brazilian Manufacturing in the face of Chinese Competition: economic restructuring, competitiveness and employment funded by the ESRC Pathfinder research projects, Grant No. RES-238-25-0006.  
^2	  This of course is a logical impossibility since if China accounted for the entire market, then Brazil would not be exporting the product at the same time
^3	  Since we are interested in competition between Brazil and China in each of the markets studied, we use  the ‘Several Commodities/One Market’ case analysed by Fageberg and Sollie to carry out the decomposition
^4	  See Batista (2008) for the mathematical proof that Equation (5) satisfies these requirements.
^5	  The decomposition involved in CMS analysis involves comparing a base year and an end year over which changes occur.  When sub-periods are identified the end year of one period becomes the base year of the next period in order to ensure coverage of the entire period.
^6	   Market economy status is a WTO designation which affects the ease with which countries can apply anti-dumping measures.  By achieving this status, China hopes that it will not be subject to so many anti-dumping actions.  The US, the European Union and Japan all still regard China as a non-market economy.
^7	  At the time of writing data is not yet available on Uruguayan imports at the 6-digit level for 2010.
^8	  Venezuela became a member of Mercosur in 2012.
^9	  Figures 2-5 are all based on UNCOMTRADE data.
^10	  This increase is not so marked in Europe but this is because China already exported a wide range of products to the EU in 1996.
^11	  The main exceptions in the region are Mexico, where the ESI is similar to that for its NAFTA partner the USA, and Paraguay.  Since it is often asserted that many Chinese products imported to Paraguay are subsequently smuggled to other countries in the region, data on imports from China used to calculate the ESI may not be a very good measure of the extent to which Chinese and Brazilian goods compete in the Paraguayan market..
^12	  In 2010 RBMs accounted for 66% of Brazilian exports to the EU and 45% of exports to the US compared to only 5% for Chinese exports to those markets.
^13	  In both cases the ESI peaked in 2005.
^14	  This reflects the fact that Brazil has tended to move out of those products where it faced most intense competition from China.
^15	  The only exceptions are Colombia and, Paraguay between 2004-2007 when a gain in competitiveness at the product level was outweighed by the negative composition effect, and Paraguay (2001-2004) and Uruguay (2004-2007) when Brazil’s share of imports rose despite a decline in product competitiveness.
^16	  The figures for Uruguay are not comparable since the data only covers the period 2007-2009.
^17	  The loss to China by product was calculated at the level of each market and the country level losses aggregated to provide the regional figures.
^18	  These were identified by adding the dollar value of the loss of market to China estimated for 2004-2007 and 2007-2010.  The top six HS Chapters accounted for 70% of the total loss to China in Latin America, 75% in the EU and 76% in the US for this period.
^19	  This reflects the fact that Brazil had achieved far more significant penetration of the US footwear market than in the EU.  In the late 1990s Brazil accounted for almost 10% of US footwear imports and in 2004 it still had 6.5% of the import market.  By 2010, Brazil’s share of US imports had dropped by almost 5 percentage points to 1.7%.  In contrast in the EU Brazil never reached 1% of total footwear imports so that increased Chinese imports had much less of an impact on Brazilian exports.
^20	  This last product was the result of the displacement of Brazilian exports of the herbicide glyphosate, which is used on GM soybeans, by China in the Argentine market.
^21	  Lall further disaggregates Resource Based Manufactures into those which are Agro-based and others (oil and mineral based), Low Technology Manufacturers into those from textiles, garments and footwear and others, Medium Technology Manufactures into Automotive, Process and Engineering industries; and High Technology Manufactures into Electronic/electrical Products and other.  Here we only make use of the four broad categories.
^22	  The proportion of firms competing with Chinese exporters who reported that they lost customers to China increased from 54% in 2006 to 67% in 2010 (CNI, 2011, p.4)
